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1Introduction
The grouping of 10 Southeast Asian nations may be able to emulate the European Union (EU) but this is 
unlikely to come true in the near future, former Prime Minister Tun Dr Mahathir Mohamad has 
predicted. He said the 10 nations could become closer like the EU but this would happen only over time 
as there were too many differences among the ASEAN countries. “In time, maybe we can introduce a 
common currency. But this must not be done by doing away with local currencies. The local currency 
can be used domestically while the common currency for trade between the 10 countries. That would be 
a start.”
China has emerged as a major economic power and attracted many western investors to the East, and for 
many, the legendary wealth and prosperity of the ancient culture of India and rich resources in South 
Asia, has attracted European commerce, exploration and colonialism. Japan is particularly managed to 
develop its economy due to a reformation in the 19th century. The Japanese economy continues to grow
well into the 20th century and its economic growth resulted numerous shortages of resources. As a 
result, Japan began to expand into other Asian countries which were rich in natural resources and cheap 
labours. Hence, a great part of Asian countries were annexed with Japanese economic expansions.
The Indian economy coupled with the Chinese economy started to power Asia into one of the hotspots 
for world trade. The Chinese economy was already booming with the economical measures undertaken 
by Jiang Zemin. Currently, China's GDP topped at 10% growth annually and India's at around 9%. Asia 
is showing its potential. One of the factors is the sheer size of the population in this region. Given the 
large number of cheap and amply available labour in the region, particularly in China and India, where 
large workforces provide numerous advantages for economy growth.
During the early 1990s, most of the Asian countries enjoyed a growth rate of nearly 9% annually (Table 
1). However, this impressive growth had dramatically changed in 1997. Massive devaluation on Thai 
Baht took place on 14 and 15 May 1997, forced the Central Bank of Thailand to float the baht on 2 July 
1997. At first, the economic crisis was limited to Thailand's financial sector, but it quickly spread to
engulf other Asian economies as well. The economy of Thailand, Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia were 
subsequently contracted more than 6% in 1998. The damages on Singapore and the Philippines were 
comparatively small, while Japan, China and India were largely escaped from the crisis. Nevertheless, 
by 1999, most countries had recovered from the crisis. This table also highlights Asia and World rank of 
selected Asian countries in 2006. It’s clearly indicated that the GDP nominal of Japan, China, Korea and 
India are the top rank in Asia whereas Japan and China remained at top five in the world.
The Asian economic crisis had alerted the members of Asian countries to review the sole dependence on 
the U.S. Dollar for regional trade. It seems like Japanese Yen, the major currency in this world besides 
U.S. Dollar, Euro Dollar and British Pound, maybe can be used as an alternative vehicle currency in 
Asian region. Several incidents in the past when the Yen appreciates against the Dollar, the economic 
growth rate of Asia picks up. It has happened between 1986 and 1988 and again between 1991 and 
1995. At the end of 1997, Thailand was hit by currency speculators, and the value of the Baht along with 
its annual growth rate fell dramatically. Soon after, the crisis spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, South 
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and many other Asian economies, resulting in great economic damages to 
the affected countries except Japan.
This study attempts to empirically assess the financial integration of Asian countries by examining their 
exchange rates movements. Both the multilateral and bilateral relationship between the individual 
exchange rates denominated in Yen is examined through the cointegration and Granger-causality 
2techniques. It has been suspected that the 1997 Asian financial crisis may have affected any financial 
integration among these countries. Hence, the analysis of data is separated into three sample periods, 
pre-crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis periods in order to identify any possible differences in the pattern 
of financial integration of Asian currencies in these three sub-periods
Literature Reviews on Asian Exchange Rates Integration
Several authors have used the convergence of exchange rates to investigate financial integration in Asian 
countries. Aggarwal and Mougoue (1993) examined the existence of ‘yen bloc’ by employing the time-
series stochastic behavior and cointegration of five Asian currencies (Japanese Yen, Hong Kong Dollar, 
Malaysian Ringgit, Philippines Peso, and Singapore Dollar). Based on daily exchange rates from 27 
September 1982 to 22 December 1989, they found strong evidences of a Yen block. 
Tse and Ng (1997) pointed out that the inclusion of Hong Kong Dollar in the set of exchange rate by 
Aggarwal and Mougoue (1993) may be inappropriate as the currency has been pegged to U.S. Dollar 
and countries like South Korea and Taiwan that have close trade relationship with Japan should be 
included in the analysis. They disaggregate the sample period into two sample-periods. First sample-
period is from September 1982 to December 1989 that corresponded with Aggarwal and Mougoue 
(1993), and second sample-period ended in 30 June 1994. In contrast to the finding of Aggarwal and 
Mougoue (1993), they found that if South Korea Won and Taiwan Dollar are excluded from the set of 
currencies, the currencies are not cointegrated. They also indicated that the number of cointegrating 
vectors increased when sample period extended to 1994. 
Aggarwal and Mougoue (1996) examined the cointegrating relationship of exchange rates between 
Japanese Yen with two sets of Asian currencies. First set of currencies consisted of currencies of the 
Asian Tigers Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan; and second set, the currencies of 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. Daily exchange rates spanning from October 1983 to 
February 1992 were used. By using the procedure advocated by Park and Sung (1994), a structural break 
that coincided with October 1987 stock market crash was detected and further analysis were conducted 
on two sub-periods. Both sets of Asian currencies are found to be cointegrated. Besides, they also 
examined the influence of the Japanese Yen among the other Asian currencies relative to the U.S. 
Dollar. Their results showed that influence of Japanese Yen in both sets of the currencies has increased 
relatively to the U.S. Dollar. 
Chaudhry (1996) examined the co-movement in the Japanese Yen, Australian Dollar, Singapore Dollar, 
Malaysian Ringgit and New Zealand Dollar. The results from the VAR suggested that the Japanese Yen, 
Australian Dollar and Singapore Dollar influence the behaviour of the other currencies. In addition, they 
have also investigated the nature of change in these relationships over the two important currency-
coordinating agreements, the ‘managed-float’ Plaza Accord (January, 1985 to February, 1987) and the 
‘target-zone’ Louvre Accord (February 1987 to December 1989). Evidence of integration of these 
currencies during the ‘target-zone’ Louvre Accord was found. However, evidence does not support 
integration for the ‘managed-float’ Plaza Accord interval.
Baharumshah and Goh (2005) examined the exchange rates relationship between Japan and seven East 
Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand) using 
quarterly data from 1978:1 to 1998:3. In order to investigate whether several events that took place in 
1990s (the Mexico tequila crisis, rise of U.S. dollar, devaluation of yuan) had affected these financial 
markets, three sub-periods have been used in the analysis. Period 1 spans from 1978:1 to 1994:1; Period 
2 covers from 1978:1 to 1996:2; Period 3 starts from 1978:1 and ends in 1998:3. They found that the 
3Philippines Peso and Korean Won do not belong to the cointegrating relationship and the 
macroeconomic shocks experienced in 1994-1996 have not distorted the Yen’s influence in the region.
This study attempts to extent the existing literatures by including more Asian countries and more recent 
data, following the establishment of ASEAN-5+3 cooperation. Taking into account the 1997 financial 
crisis, this study also investigate any possible differences in the pattern of financial integration of Asian 
countries in pre-crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis periods.
Data and Empirical Results
The data set consists of the daily exchange rates for eight Asian currencies covering the period from 1st
November 1993 to 31th December 2007. The exchange rates are Indonesian Rupiah (ID), Malaysian 
Ringgit (MY), Philippines Peso (PH), Singapore Dollar (SG), Thailand Baht (TH), China Yuan (CN),
Korean Won (KR) and Indian Rupee (IR) against the Japanese Yen. The analysis of data are divided into 
three sample periods: first, pre-crisis period spanning from 1st November 1988 to 13th May 1997; 
second, crisis-period from 14th May 1997 to 31st August 1998; and third, post-crisis period from 1st 
September 1998 to 31th December 2007.1
The order of integration of the series was determined using the Dickey-Fuller (DF) / Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test. Table 3 shows the results. The results of both unit root tests clearly 
show that the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at the 5% level for all currencies in their 
levels. However, the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% level when all currencies have been tested in their 
first-differences. Thus, these result indicates that all eight Asian currencies are integrated of order one, 
I(1). 
Since the series are of same order, we proceed to test the existence of cointegrating relations among the 
exchange rate series using Johansen multivariate cointegration test. The results are shown in Table 4. 
The results indicated that the null hypothesis of no cointegrating vector couldn’t be rejected in the pre-
crisis period because only trace test statistically significant but not significant for max-eigen test. We 
only consider the existence of cointegrating vector if both statistics are significant at the same time. 
Therefore, we concluded that there is no cointegration among the currencies before the crisis. It is 
rejected in the crisis with 5 percent level of significance and post-crisis periods with 1 percent level of 
significance. This implies that Asian currencies are not cointegrated in the pre-crisis period but they are 
cointegrated with one cointegrating vector in the crisis and post-crisis periods.
We are aware that although the cointegration may exist among eight Asian currencies in the crisis and 
post-crisis periods, but not all of these currencies will enter the cointegration vector. To this purpose, we 
performed the exclusion test by imposing zero restriction on the  coefficient of cointegrating vector. 
Table 5 shows the results. The log-likelihood ratio (LR) showed that Indonesia Rupiah, the Philippines 
Peso, Korea Won, China Yuan and India Rupee rejected the hypothesis null of cointegrating parameter 
equal to zero during the crisis period. The results suggested that Singapore Dollar, Malaysia Ringgit and 
Thailand Baht could be excluded from the system of exchange rate. For post-crisis period, the log-
likelihood ratio indicated that all except Indonesia Rupiah, Thailand Baht, China Yuan and India Rupee 
rejected the exclusion hypothesis. This implies that Indonesia, Thailand, China and India currencies 
could be excluded from the system of exchange rate.
                                                
1 Crisis period was considered starting from massive attack on the Thai baht on 14 May 1997 and ended in 31 August 1998 
where the ringgit Malaysia was pegged to USD in the next day.
4The cointegration tests are re-estimated on the remaining series. Results of the cointegration tests are 
shown in Table 5. In these two periods, both the maximum eigenvalue test and trace test rejected the null 
hypothesis of no cointegrating vector at 1 percent level of significance. The results indicated that these 
currencies are cointegrated with a unique cointegrating vector. In addition, the exclusion test results 
rejected the null hypothesis of cointegrating parameter equal to zero for all currencies (Table 6).
As the presence of cointegrating vector had been ascertain, the next step would be identifying the 
direction of causality among these few Asian currencies. Table 7 reports the results of the Granger-
causality test based on vector error-correction model (VECM) for crisis period. The negative and 
significant error-correction term (ECT) for the Philippines, India and China equations, implying that the 
currencies of these countries endogenously react to past deviations from the cointegrating relationship 
and adjusts to restore the long-run equilibrium. The small magnitude of the coefficient of error-
correction term indicates that the adjustment towards equilibrium is rather slow. Short-run unidirectional 
causal relationship has detected running from Korea Won to Indonesia Rupiah and also Indonesia 
Rupiah to the Philippines Peso. The changes in Korea Won indirectly granger caused changes in the 
Philippines Peso. These relationships are summarized as Figure 1.
The results of the Granger-causality test based on vector error-correction model (VECM) for post-crisis 
period is presented in Table 8 and depicted as Figure 2. The hypothesis that coefficient of error-
correction term (ECT) is equal to zero is easily rejected for Malaysia and Singapore equations, implying 
that the currencies of these two countries endogenously react to past deviations from the cointegrating 
relationship and adjusts to restore the long-run equilibrium. However, the speed of adjustment is quite 
slow. There is a bidirectional feedback relationship between Malaysia Ringgit and Korea Won. There is 
unidirectional causal relationship running from Singapore Dollar to Malaysia Ringgit, Korea Won and 
the Philippines Peso. Concurrently, there is a unidirectional causal relationship running from the 
Philippines Peso to Malaysia Ringgit and Korea Won.
Conclusion
As the economy of the Asian countries expand and become more integrated following the establishment 
of ASEAN-5+3 cooperation, this study attempts to examine the financial linkages between the 
currencies of the Asian countries. At the end of 1997, Thailand was hit by currency speculators. Soon 
after the crisis spread to Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and many other Asian countries, resulting in 
great damages to the affected countries (Japan largely escaped the crisis). This is showed that Japanese 
Yen is much sturdy as compared to other Asian currencies. Hence, we choose Japanese Yen as a vehicle 
currency in Asian countries for this study. We used local exchange rates denominated in Yen to study 
the relationship among the Asian countries currencies.  In order to identify any differences in the pattern 
of financial integration following the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the analysis is separated into: pre-
crisis, during-crisis and post-crisis periods. Significant non-stationarity, and the presence of unit roots 
were documented for each currency in each sample period. The results of cointegration analysis showed 
that the currencies are not cointegrated during the pre-crisis period. The cointegration relationship was 
detected among five Asian countries currencies (the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, India and China) 
during the crisis period while evidence of cointegration was found among four Asian currencies 
(Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Korea) in the post-crisis period. These findings imply that 
there is low financial integration before the crisis, but Asian countries are financially more integrated 
during and after the crisis. In particular, during the post crisis period, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, 
Malaysia and Singapore are financially integrated in long-run. Since we found that most of major 
countries in Asian have financial integration after the crisis, therefore Japanese Yen is highly 
recommended as a potential alternative vehicle currency for Asian region in the future.
5Table 1: Nominal GDP and Nominal GDP Growth Rate in Asian Countries from 1990 to 2006.
Asia World Country 1990 - 1997 1998 1999 2000 - 2006 GDP (nominal)
06' Rank 06' Rank 1996 2006 millions of US dollars
1 2 Japan 2.3 1.8 -1.0 -0.1 1.7 4,367,459
2 4 China 10.7 9.3 7.8 7.6 9.6 2,630,113
3 12 Korea 7.9 4.7 -6.9 9.5 5.2 888,267
4 13 India 5.8 4.8 6.5 6.1 6.8 886,867
7 21 Indonesia 8.0 4.7 -13.1 0.8 4.9 364,239
11 34 Thailand 8.6 -1.4 -10.5 4.4 5.0 206,258
14 39 Malaysia 9.5 7.3 -7.4 6.1 5.5 150,923
16 44 Singapore 8.8 8.3 -1.4 7.2 5.5 132,155
18 47 Philippines 2.8 5.2 -0.6 3.4 4.6 123,931
Source: International Monetary Fund
Table 2: DF/ADF Unit Root Tests
                                    Nominal exchange rate (against YEN)
Country Level First Difference
constant constant with trend constant constant with trend
I. Pre-crisis (1993 Nov 1 – 1997 May 13)
Indonesia (ID) -1.45 (1) -1.55 (1) -31.87 (0) a -31.92 (0) a
Malaysia (MY) -0.49 (1) -2.01 (1) -31.34 (0) a -31.40 (0) a
Philippines (PH) -0.87 (1) -1.54 (1) -32.82 (0) a -32.82 (0) a
Singapore (SG) -0.28 (1) -1.84 (1) -33.09 (0) a -33.11 (0) a
Thailand (TH) -2.37 (1) -2.39 (1) -67.36 (0) a -67.35 (0) a
China (CN) -0.58 (0) -1.51 (0) -33.33 (0) a -33.38 (0) a
Korea (KR) -1.49 (1) -1.95 (1) -32.65 (0) a -32.65 (0) a
India (IR) -1.73 (1) -1.57 (1) -32.86 (0) a -32.89 (0) a
II. Crisis (1997 May 14 – 1998 Aug 31)
Indonesia (ID) -1.09 (1) -1.92 (1) -18.46 (0) a -18.45 (0) a
Malaysia (MY) -1.84 (1) -1.97 (1) -18.44 (0) a -18.45 (0) a
Philippines (PH) -1.99 (0) -2.01 (0) -16.87 (1) a -16.88 (1) a
Singapore (SG) -2.28 (0) -2.64 (0) -22.10 (0) a -22.07 (0) a
Thailand (TH) -1.99 (0) -1.50 (0) -16.91 (1) a -17.00 (1) a
China (CN) -0.80 (6) -2.95 (6) -19.42 (0) a -19.40 (0) a
Korea (KR) -1.56 (0) -1.43 (0) -22.13 (0) a -22.12 (0) a
India (IR) -2.81 (9) -3.24 (9) -19.71 (0) a -19.69 (0) a
III. Post-crisis (1998 Sept 1 – 2007 Dec 31)
Indonesia (ID) -2.81 (70) -3.38 (60) -58.40 (0) a -58.39 (0) a
Malaysia (MY) -2.45 (7) -2.84 (7) -22.73 (6) a -22.76 (6) a
Philippines (PH) -2.05 (0) -1.16 (0) -59.65 (0) a -59.72 (0) a
Singapore (SG) -2.28 (2) -3.36 (2) -37.41 (1) a -37.45 (1) a
Thailand (TH) -1.02 (0) -1.88 (0) -30.54 (3) a -30.61 (3) a
China (CN) -2.84 (2) -3.23 (2) -37.56 (1) a -37.58 (1) a
Korea (KR) -1.11 (3) -2.73 (3) -40.19 (2) a -40.19 (2) a
India (IR) -2.70 (36) -2.92 (36) -37.95 (1) a -38.00 (1) a
Notes: The numbers in parenthesis are lag length. The tests employ a null hypothesis of a unit root. All series are log transformed. a and 
b denotes significance at 1% and 5% levels.
6Table 3: Johansen-Juselius Likelihood Cointegration Tests for Asian
Null 
Hypotheses Eigen  value Trace 
Critical 
Value 
(5%)
Critical     
Value            
(1%)
Max-Eigen 
Critical 
Value 
(5%)
Critical 
Value 
(1%)
I. Pre-crisis (1993 Nov 1 – 1997 May 13)
(r = 0)  0.035900  162.6148b 156.00 168.36  48.83405  51.42  57.69
(r  1)  0.025968  115.7808 124.24 133.57  33.70440  45.28  51.57
(r  2)  0.023770  82.07637  94.15 103.18  30.81664  39.37  45.10
(r  3)  0.016201  51.25974  68.52  76.07  20.92311  33.46  38.77
(r  4)  0.009484  30.33663  47.21  54.46  12.20754  27.07  32.24
(r  5)  0.007110  18.12908  29.68  35.65 9.140781  20.97  25.52
(r  6)  0.006218  8.988304  15.41  20.04  7.989948  14.07  18.63
(r  7)  0.000779  0.998356   3.76   6.65  0.998356   3.76   6.65
II. Crisis (1997 May 14 – 1998 Aug 31)
(r = 0) b  0.113574  167.7175b 156.00 168.36  56.66206b  51.42  57.69
(r  1)  0.075095  111.0554 124.24 133.57  36.69027  45.28  51.57
(r  2)  0.066220  74.36516  94.15 103.18  32.20163  39.37  45.10
(r  3)  0.030821  42.16353  68.52  76.07  14.71385  33.46  38.77
(r  4)  0.026452  27.44968  47.21  54.46  12.60004  27.07  32.24
(r  5)  0.019837  14.84964  29.68  35.65  9.416916  20.97  25.52
(r  6)  0.009708  5.432721  15.41  20.04  4.585001  14.07  18.63
(r  7)  0.001802  0.847720   3.76   6.65  0.847720   3.76   6.65
III. Post-crisis (1998 Sept 1 – 2007 Dec 31)
(r = 0) a  0.018495  186.1556a 156.00 168.36  63.45291a  51.42  57.69
(r  1)  0.010720  122.7027 124.24 133.57  36.63416  45.28  51.57
(r  2)  0.009383  86.06854  94.15 103.18  32.04352  39.37  45.10
(r  3)  0.006371  54.02502  68.52  76.07  21.72329  33.46  38.77
(r  4)  0.004248  32.30173  47.21  54.46  14.46817  27.07  32.24
(r  5)  0.003130  17.83356  29.68  35.65  10.65703  20.97  25.52
(r  6)  0.001455  7.176534  15.41  20.04  4.948503  14.07  18.63
(r  7)  0.000655  2.228031   3.76   6.65  2.228031   3.76   6.65
Notes: r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. Trace and Max-Eigen denote the trace statistic and maximum eigenvalue statistic. The 
critical values are obtained from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). a and b denote rejection of the hypothesis at 1% and 5% critical values. Lag 
selection (k) is based on Schwert (1987) formula, where k=9 for pre-crisis period, k=5 for crisis period, and k=11 for post crisis period.
Table 4: Exclusion Restriction Tests for Asian
Country Likelihood Ratio (LR)
II. Crisis (1997 May 14 – 1998 Aug 31) III. Post-crisis (1998 Sept 1 – 2007 May 16)
ID 5.299b 1.161
MY 1.139 2.815c
PH 6.700a 4.101b
SG 1.486 15.628a
TH 2.072 0.714
CN 5.727b 0.851
KR 10.993a 11.886a
IR 19.605a 1.717
Note: Figures are the likelihood ratio statistics (asymptotically distributed 2) for testing the null hypothesis that each coefficient is 
statistically equivalent to zero in single cointegrating vector. a, b, and c denotes significance at 1% , 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
7Table 5: Johansen-Juselius Likelihood Cointegration Tests for Remaining Asian 
Countries
Null 
Hypotheses Eigen  
value
Trace 
Critical 
Value 
(5%)
Critical 
Value 
(1%)
Max-Eigen 
Critical 
Value 
(5%)
Critical 
Value 
(1%)
II. Crisis (1997 May 14 – 1998 Aug 31)
Countries: ID, PH, CN, KR, IR
(r = 0) a  0.102180  91.35758a  68.52  76.07  50.65910a  33.46  38.77
(r  1)  0.060246  40.69848  47.21  54.46  29.20461b  27.07  32.24
(r  2)  0.013765  11.49388  29.68  35.65  6.514349  20.97  25.52
(r  3)  0.010480  4.979526  15.41  20.04  4.951391  14.07  18.63
(r  4)  0.000059  0.028136   3.76   6.65  0.028136   3.76   6.65
III. Post-crisis (1998 Sept 1 – 2007 Dec 31)
Countries: MY, PH, SG, KR
(r = 0) a  0.013593  66.89630a  47.21  54.46  46.51799a  14.07  18.63
(r  1)  0.003490  20.37831  29.68  35.65  11.88254   3.76   6.65
(r  2)  0.001829  8.495776  15.41  20.04  6.222113  14.07  18.63
(r  3)  0.000669  2.273663   3.76   6.65  2.273663   3.76   6.65
Notes: r indicates the number of cointegrating vectors. Trace and Max-Eigen denote the trace statistic and maximum 
eigenvalue statistic. The critical values are obtained from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). a and b denote rejection of the 
hypothesis at 1% and 5% critical values. Lag selection (k) is based on Schwert (1987) formula, where k=5 for crisis 
period and k=11 for post crisis period.
Table 6: Exclusion Restriction Tests for Remaining Asian Countries
Country Likelihood Ratio (LR)
II. Crisis (1997 May 14 – 1998 Aug 31) III. Post-crisis (1998 Sept 1 – 2007 May 16)
ID 4.329b
MY 15.813a
PH 20.660a 4.927b
SG 31.199a
TH
CN 6.789a
KR 13.416a 26.337a
IR 20.152a
Note: Figures are the likelihood ratio statistics (asymptotically distributed 2) for testing the null hypothesis that each coefficient is 
statistically equivalent to zero in single cointegrating vector. a, b, and c denotes significance at 1% , 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Table 7: Granger Causality Results based on VECM (Crisis)
Independent Variable
2-statistic ECTDependent 
Variable ∆PH ∆ID ∆KR ∆IR ∆CH [t-stat]
∆PH - 10.367b 4.319 1.841 3.677 -0.019b
[0.0347] [0.3645] [0.7649] [0.4515] [-2.1043]
∆ID 7.094 - 21.050a 9.382 3.496 -0.010
[0.1310] [0.0003] [0.0522] [0.4784] [-0.3465]
∆KR 3.158 0.924 - 1.275 1.541 -0.013
[0.5317] [0.9212] [0.8656] [0.8193] [-0.6932]
∆IR 3.433 5.52 5.771 - 3.626 -0.035a
[0.4881] [0.2380] [0.2169] [0.4590] [-6.5627]
∆CH 1.913 1.703 6.58 4.051 - -0.024a
[0.7517] [0.7902] [0.1598] [0.3991] [-4.8719]
Note: 2-statistic tests the joint significance of the lagged values of the independent variables, and t-statistic tests the 
significance of the error-correction term (ECT). a and b denotes significance at  1% and 5% levels. 
8Figure 1: Short-run Causal Relationship (Crisis)
   KR                      ID                    PH
                                
                                     Note:  2-statistic tests the joint significance of the lagged values of the independent variables,
                                                        and t-statistic tests the significance of the error-correction term (ECT). a and b denotes 
                                                        significance at  1% and 5% levels. 
Figure 2: Short-run Causal Relationship (Post-crisis)
                                                       SG                                           MY
                                                        PH                                          KR
       
     
Dependent 
Variable
∆MY ∆PH ∆SG ∆KR
 ECT
[t-stat]
∆MY - 66.325a 234.638a 27.493a -0.020a
[0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0012]
∆PH 5.991 - 36.314a 7.760 0.007
[0.7408] [0.0000] [0.5585]
∆SG 1.293 8.200 - 7.222 -0.014a
[0.9984] [0.5141] [0.6141]
∆KR 46.522a 21.431b 112.007a - -0.006
[0.0000] [0.0109] [0.0000]
Table 8: Granger Causality Results based on VECM (Post-crisis)
Independent Variable
2-statistic
[-2.9738]
[1.3211]
[-3.4019]
[-0.8723]
